From Juridical Idealism to Institutional Decay: The Rule of Law Conundrum
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59075/jssa.v3i2.234Keywords:
Rule of Law, Judicial Independence, Doctrine of Necessity, Military Coups, Fundamental Rights, Separation of Powers, Constitutional AmendmentAbstract
This article examines the rule of law as a foundation of Pakistan’s legal and constitutional system, endorsing fairness, accountability, and judicial independence. However, its enforcement is often weakened by political influence, inefficiencies in the judiciary, and unfair application of laws. Weak institutions, long court delays, and government overreach further reduce legal certainty and public trust in the justice system. The 26th Constitutional Amendment has raised serious concerns about judicial independence by changing how judges are appointed and increasing the risk of political control over the judiciary. This article also looks at how Pakistan’s legal system aligns with international laws while highlighting repeated challenges in its implementation. Outdated laws, unfair enforcement, and lack of transparency in the judicial process create governance issues and limit access to justice. The absence of fair judge appointments, proper legal aid, and strong accountability measures makes the situation worse. This article finally suggests the need for institutional reforms to protect judicial independence, improve court efficiency, and introduce digital case management. Strengthening alternative dispute resolution (ADR), protecting marginalized groups, creating independent oversight bodies, and increasing public legal awareness would help uphold the rule of law. A truly independent judiciary, clear separation of powers, and a strong commitment to protecting fundamental rights are necessary for a stable democracy. Without urgent reforms, the decline of judicial fairness and legal equality will continue, weakening Pakistan’s governance and social justice system.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2025 Journal for Social Science Archives

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.